A central topic in the logic of science concerns the proper semantic analysis of theoretical sentences, that is sentences containing theoretical terms. In this paper, we present a novel choice-semantical account of theoretical truth based on the epsilonterm definition of theoretical terms. Specifically, we develop two ways of specifying the truth conditions of theoretical statements in a choice functional semantics, each giving rise to a corresponding logic of such statements. In order to investigate the inferential strength of these logical systems, we provide a translation of each truth definition into a modal definition of theoretical truth. Based on this, we show that the stronger notion of choice-semantical truth captures more adequately our informal semantic understanding of scientific statements.
Introduction
A central topic in the logic of science concerns the proper semantic analysis of theoretical terms and theoretical sentences. How, if at all, do theoretical terms refer to their objects? In what ways do the theoretical postulates of a theory contribute to the specification of the meaning of these terms? Finally, how should we evaluate semantically scientific statements that contain theoretical terms? Carnap and Ramsey were the first to address these question using formal tools, thus providing the foundation for virtually all subsequent research on the semantics of theoretical terms (cf. [22] , [32] , [27] , [16] , [31] , etc.).
Let us explain the challenges of a semantic analysis of theoretical terms with a simple example, taken from collision mechanics. Suppose we have two spherical objects s 1 and s 2 . s 2 is at rest at time t, whereas s 1 moves toward s 2 with a certain velocity v 1 . Then, s 1 collides with s 2 to the effect that s 1 is at rest at time t (t > t), whereas s 2 moves with the velocity v 2 = v 1 at t . In other words, the first spherical objects transfers its momentum to the second by an elastic collision. As is well known, this experiment lets us infer that the two objects must have the same mass.
How can we draw the distinction between theoretical and observational concepts in this experiment? Arguably, the concept of mass is theoretical because we understand this concept in terms of scientific theories, such as collision mechanics and classical mechanics. The metrical concepts of space, time and velocity may be argued to be theoretical as well because our understanding of these concepts depends on certain measurement theories. However, we can take these concepts as (relatively) observational in the context of classical and collision mechanics because classical and collision mechanics are not needed to understand space, time, and velocity in non-relativistic physics.
The challenge arising here is to devise a semantics that explains how classical and collision mechanics shape the meaning of the concept of mass. Ideally, this semantics should specify rules for the assignment of truth-values to statements about the mass of the two objects in our experiment. What may be described as standard semantics fails to account for the genuine semantic properties of theoretical terms. For when using a logical language L for the representation of statements about some domain, it is standard to assume a complete and direct extensional interpretation of the descriptive vocabulary of L. Such an interpretation fails to display the semantic dependency of theoretical terms on a scientific theory.
Logical accounts of theoretical terms have in common that the scientific theory in question somehow constrains the interpretation of these terms. This constraint leaves some degree of indeterminacy as it does not result in a unique interpretation of theoretical terms. In our simple collision experiment, the interpretation of theoretical terms is constrained by the laws of elastic collisions, i.e. conservation of momentum as well as conservation of energy. Given the values of the velocities of the objects, before and after the collision, these two conservation laws are verified by a range of interpretations of the concept of mass. Hence, we have an indeterminacy of interpretation of the concept of mass. Yet, we want to say that certain statements about the mass of the two bodies are true, while others are false. By conservation of momentum, we know that m 1 = m 2 must come out true, whereas m 1 < m 2 should come out false; m 1 and m 2 designate the mass of the two objects, respectively.
The question thus arises how the truth-values of the statements about the mass of the two objects are determined by a range of interpretations. This is the key question to be addressed in what follows. We shall explain in detail how a scientific theory determines a range of interpretations of the theoretical terms and how these interpretations, in turn, determine the semantic values of theoretical statements.
Two logical accounts of theoretical terms
In Carnap's logic of science we can recognize two logical accounts of theoretical terms.
One centers around the notion of an indirect and partial interpretation of theoretical terms ( [6, 7, 8] ). Roughly, this account states that the interpretation of the theoretical terminology of a scientific theory is not specified directly through metatheoretic definitions but indirectly through the postulates of the theory. 1 The second account originates from the Ramsey sentence and makes use of Hilbert's epsilon operator, thereby aiming at an explicit definition of theoretical terms ( [9, 29] ). 2 Whereas the former account is couched in semantic terms, the latter is purely syntactic. Neither approach, however, gives us an explication of theoretical truth, i.e. a fully-fledged semantics of theoretical statements.
The present paper has two principal objectives. The first one is to provide an explicit model-theoretic analysis of the epsilon account of theoretical terms based on a choicefunctional semantics for the epsilon operator ( [21, 4, 24] ). In particular, we shall develop two different choice-semantical approaches to the semantics of theoretical statements, each giving rise to a corresponding logic of such statements. The second objective of the paper is to investigate the inferential strength of the two logics underlying the different choice-semantical approaches to theoretical truth. This will be done by relating them to recent work on the model-theoretic explication of Carnap's indirect interpretation view of theoretical terms. 3 More precisely, we shall exploit the modal reconstruction of theoretical truth by Andreas [2] . According to this account, a scientific sentence (containing both observational and theoretical terms) is theoretically true if and only if it is true in all admissible extensions of its intended observational model, that is, in all model extensions that interpret the theoretical terms in accordance with the theory's axioms. This modal explication turns out to be equivalent with the particular choice-semantical explication of theoretical truth to be developed here. 4 Moreover, the equivalence between the modal explication of the indirect interpretation view of theoretical terms and the choice functional account of the epsilon reconstruction of theoretical knowledge also shows that the two accounts are conceptually similar in several respects. In particular, the meaning of theoretical terms is specified contextually, i.e. relative to a given theoretical context in both approaches. Moreover, both accounts make precise in different ways a central intuition driving systematic work on theoretical terms since Carnap, viz ., that the determination of such terms by a scientific theory remains incomplete (see [2, 30] ). The paper will be organized as follows: Section 3 briefly outlines the epsilon-term reconstruction of scientific theories as well as the epsilon logic and choice semantics underlying it. Based on this, we present two possible model-theoretic explications of theoretical truth in line with Carnap's general approach. Section 4 will then turn to a closer comparison between these choice-semantical explications and the above mentioned modal account of theoretical truth. By means of this comparison, we shall investigate the inferential strength of the two choice-semantical explications of theoretical truth in Section 5.
Finally, Section 7 will give a summary of our findings.
Choice semantics and theoretical truth
In this section, we develop a choice-semantical account of theoretical truth based on Carnap's epsilon-term definition of theoretical terms [9, 29] . According to the syntactic (or received) view of theories, a scientific theory T can be expressed in a higher-order 3 Compare [16] for a detailed discussion of this account of theoretical terms and its historical development in Carnap's work. 4 The modal explication is inspired by supervaluation logic, as readers will easily recognize in Section 4.
language L(V o , V t ) that contains a set of observational terms V o and a set of theoretical terms V t . To keep the discussion simple, we will assume that the descriptive vocabulary consists only of unary predicates and relational symbols. A complex sentence TC of this language is usually said to express the conjunction of the axioms of T (see, e.g., [2, 20] ).
Carnap's logical reconstruction of theories is based on two steps. 5 The first one is the elimination of the theoretical terms in L(V o , V t ) by the ramsification of a theory. As is well know, the Ramsey sentence of a given T is constructed by substituting its theoretical terms by existentially quantified variables of the proper logical category:
The Ramsey sentence-henceforth abbreviated by RS(T)-is expressed in the "observa-
Roughly speaking, it says that there exist theoretical relations in the universe of the language that have the features which the theory attributes to them.
Carnap's second step consists in the subsequent reintroduction of the theoretical vocabulary through an explicit definition in language L(V o ) supplemented by a logical -operator. The -operator was originally introduced in Hilbert's proof-theoretic work in the 1920s. 6 It functions syntactically as a term-forming operator: if A(x) is a formula with x occurring as free first-order variable in it, then x A(x) is a term where all occurrences of x are bound. This term picks out an arbitrary object from the extension of A in case this extension is non-empty. Applied to formulas with free higher-order variables, the epsilon operator functions in a similar way. In the present context, we restrict our attention to predicate variables (of finite arities): let A(X) be a formula with one free n-ary predicate variable X occurring in it. The expression X A(X) then presents a higher-order term that picks out an arbitrary n-ary relation on the domain of the model in which statement A is true.
This operator is applied in [9] in the following way: let T = T 1 , . . . , T n stand for the n-ary tuple of all theoretical terms described by T. Then the explicit definition of this tuple has the following form:
Informally speaking, the theoretical symbols are defined here as referring to an arbitrary tuple of relations that, if assigned to the free variables in RS(T), make the Ramsey sentence true. Put differently, the definition picks out one arbitrary sequence of extensions of the theoretical vocabulary in case the theory in question is internally consistent and consistent with the empirical facts.
Based on this general definition of the tuple of all theoretical terms, the extension of each singular term T i (for 1 ≤ i ≤ n) can then be specified relative to this particular choice (if T i has an extension), namely as the i-th element of tuple P t :
The original presentation of the epsilon reconstruction of theories in [9] is purely syntac- 
A choice function thus picks out a "representative" object for any non-empty set and an arbitrary object from domain D if the set in question is empty.
In the case of second-order epsilon terms built from n-ary predicate variables, a suitable choice function will be of the form
we have:
Given this account of extensional choice functions, closed -terms are interpreted relative to a structure M, an assignment function s to first-order and predicate variables, and choice functions δ, ∆ on M based on the following two valuation rules: 11
These rules state that the referent of an -term constructed from A is the element (or relation) that the choice function picks from the set of objects (or relations) defined by formula A in model M.
The choice-functional treatment of epsilon logic gives us a way to make precise the 10 The epsilon-symbol is treated as a functional variable here that effectively ranges over possible choice functions on a given model. This variable choice conception is first developed in Asser: "Das Zeichen schlielich ist eine Variable für Auswahlfunktionen des Individuenbereichs J" [4, p.33] . See [21] for a different account. 11 We restrict our attention here to valuation rules for the special case of closed epsilon terms. For a more general treatment of valuation rules for epsilon terms with parameters, see [24, pp.33-34] .
informal semantics underlying the present account of theoretical terms and theoretical statements. In order to do so, we have to describe the epsilon reconstruction of theories also from a model-theoretic perspective. Let us assume in the following that language L(V o , V t ) is interpreted relative to a single domain of individuals. All variables of the language range over domain D or over higher-order domains constructible from it. 12 13 An interpretation of the theoretical terms is thus specified relative to an expansion of the base model by relations that satisfy the theoretical axioms in question. We call an L(V o , V t )-structure admissible if it is an expansion of the observational model O that satisfies the axioms of T (cf. [2] , [3] ).
Assuming that the Ramsey sentence of a theory is satisfied, it follows that the epsilonterm definition picks out an arbitrary instance of such a tuple of relations for the interpretation of the theoretical terms. Notice that the definiens in the epsilon-term definition scheme contains the "variabilized" theory, that is an open formula of the form 12 We will also assume that the higher-order quantifiers of L(V o , V t ) have a standard interpretation. In particular, predicate variables are supposed to range over the full powerset ℘(D n ), for each arity n.
13 See [20, p.293] and [14] .
This formula defines the class of interpretations of the theoretical predicates of language L(V o , V t ) relative to theory T:
This is, informally speaking, the class of all extensional interpretations of the theoretical vocabulary that, if joined with the given observational model, result in full models of T. 14 An epsilon term in the above definition can be evaluated semantically in the base model O and relative to a particular choice function constructible from it. Such a function assigns a particular member of the class Ext(V t ) T to that class. 15 The interpretation of theoretical terms can then be specified relative to such a higher-order choice function.
Specifically, we can specify the interpretation of the tuple T of predicates in L(V o , V t ) based on a semantic valuation of its defining epsilon term relative to model O, assignment function s and higher-order choice function ∆ in the following way:
The reference of the theoretical predicates in a full model of the language is specified here in terms of the choice-functional interpretation of their defining -term, namely as an arbitrary sequence of relations that make the ramsified theory true in model O.
The choice semantics for -languages not only gives us a precise account of the reference of theoretical terms that nicely corresponds to Carnap's purely syntactic approach. It also provides the means for a model-theoretic analysis of the semantics of theoretical sentences, where a sentence qualifies as theoretical if and only if it contains theoretical 14 Alternatively, we can take Ext(V t ) T to be the class of possible assignments to the 'theoretical' variables of the observational language that make RS(T) true in O. 15 To give a simple example, let V t contain only one binary predicate P(x, y). The class Ext(V t ) T (for a given theory T) will then consist of relations of type R ⊆ D × D. A suitable choice function will then be a function of the form:
terms. As is shown in [21, 4, 24, 36] , one can define a general notion of truth for statements of L based on the standard valuation and satisfaction rules for predicate logic and the valuation rules for epsilon terms stated above. We will express the fact that the formula A (containing epsilon terms) is satisfied in model M, relative to a choice function δ and an assignment function s by M, δ, s |= A.
A semantic evaluation of theoretical statements based on this choice-functional notion of satisfaction comes in two steps: In the first step, a translation of language L(V o , V t ) in the observational language supplemented by an epsilon operator L (V o ) has to be specified that maps all theoretical sentences to their -term translations, i.e. to sentences gained by the systematic substitution of t-terms by their defining -terms. Let ϕ be a sentence in a theoretical language that contains a number of theoretical predicates (and possibly also observational predicates). Then, given the suggested definition scheme for theoretical terms, there is a function that maps the theoretical sentence ϕ to a sentence ϕ in which each occurrence of a term T i in ϕ is substituted by its defining -term. More formally, a relative translation of language
can be given by a mapping F that associates each theoretical relation symbol T i (of arity m) with its epsilon-operator definition in the above specified sense. 16 Based on this, a translation function ϕ for L(V o , V t ) sentences ϕ can be specified inductively in the following way:
Given this relative translation, the second step is then to evaluate the resulting -translation ϕ of each theoretical statement in terms of the choice-functional semantics presented above. As should be clear, ϕ can be interpreted in the base model O and relative to a suitable choice function on it.
Given this, we can give an explication of the truth of theoretical sentences in choicefunctional terms. Specifically, we can distinguish between two types of theoretical truth based on two different truth conditions for epsilon-term statements given in [24] . Let There seem to be at least three "natural" options for relativizing the semantics of epsilontranslations to choice functions. First, truth relative to a particular choice function δ with respect to O. Second, local truth as just defined. Third, generic truth as just defined. The first option might be in the spirit of the epsilon operator, but it would make the semantics of theoretical sentences dependent upon an arbitrary choice of a particular choice function. No such dependence is implied by the latter two options. Hence, it is reasonable to pursue these options.
The challenge arising here is to decide which, if any, of the two notions of truth explicates the content of our assertions of theoretical sentences in science. In the next two 17 The terms local and generic truth are introduced in Meyer Viol's study of intensional and extensional epsilon logic in [24] . A similar distinction can already be found in [4] . Notice, moreover, that the local truth of theoretical statements so construed is closely related to the notion of partial truth discussed in the framework of partial structures by [12] . It is easy to show that the local truth of ϕ is definable in terms of the partial truth of ϕ in a simple pragmatic structure. 18 Notice that a given formula ϕ can be both locally true (i.e. true relative to a given choice function) and locally false (relative to another choice function). This problematic fact will be discussed in further detail in Section 5.
sections, we shall answer this question by comparing the present approach with another, well established model-theoretic explication of the semantics of theoretical terms. This is Andreas' modal (or supervaluationist) account of theoretical truth ( [1] , [2] ). Based on his approach, we will propose a modal translation of local truth and generic truth, respectively. This translation enables us to recognize two different logics to which the two different notions of truth give rise. It turns out that only one of the two logics is inferentially strong enough to account for scientific reasoning.
A modal translation
As was shown in the previous section, the explicit epsilon-term definition
leaves us with a range of admissible interpretations of the theoretical terms:
Together with the fixed interpretation R o of the observational predicates, any member of Ext(V t ) T defines a complete interpretation of L(V o , V t ). We can conceive of these interpretations as possible worlds:
Figuratively speaking, any world w ∈ W represents a way things may be like, assuming the interpretation R o of the observational predicates and the truth of the Ramsey sentence RS(T). Let us now adopt a standard S5 modal semantics, where we have R = W × W for the accessibility relation R. As we do not distinguish between interpretations of L(V o , V t ) and worlds, our first order modal model of L(V o , V t ) has the following simple structure:
Arguably, this modal model formally represents the interpretation of theoretical terms in line with [8] . For, first, the postulates TC indirectly interpret the theoretical terms by constraining their interpretation: TC must be true in any possible world. This constraint does not yield a complete interpretation of the theoretical terms, however. Their interpretation remains incomplete in the sense of leaving a certain degree of indeterminacy:
any of the possible worlds w ∈ W represents an admissible interpretation.
We are now in a position to define two alternative notions of theoretical truth: For L(V o ) sentences ϕ, the two notions of truth coincide, provided the Ramsey sentence RS(T) is true. Furthermore, on condition of RS(T), the conjunction TC of postulates is both strongly and weakly theoretically true. However, there clearly are L(V o , V t ) sentences ϕ for which the two notions of theoretical truth diverge from one another. This follows from W not being a singleton. Recall that W cannot be singleton because this would contradict the doctrine that the interpretation of theoretical terms is incomplete. 20 The two modal notions of theoretical truth translate, respectively, the semantics of theoretical sentences that we have defined using choice functions in the preceding section:
1. ϕ is locally true if and only if M |= ♦ϕ.
ϕ is generically true if and only if M |= ϕ.
19 Strong theoretical truth has been suggested as an explication of theoretical truth in [2] . 20 It follows from the incompleteness of the determination of theoretical terms that, for any theoretical term T i , there are at least two admissible interpretations of L(V o , V t ) that interpret T i differently. Let us call them w 1 and w 2 . Hence, there is a theoretical sentence ϕ such that w 1 |= ϕ and w 2 |= ϕ. Therefore, if W is the set of admissible interpretations represented by the modal model M, we have M |= ♦ϕ but M |= ϕ.
This observation follows easily from the definition of M and the way in which choicefunctional truth was specified in Section 3. Recall from above that a theoretical statement was said to be locally true if there exists at least one choice function on the observational model that picks out an admissible interpretation of the theoretical vocabulary in question.
In turn, a theoretical statement was said to be generically true if and only if every possible choice function on the observational base model picks out an admissible interpretation of these terms.
As we saw, one way to characterize whether an interpretation is theoretically admissible, i.e. admissible relative to a given axiomatic theory, can be given in terms of the notion of model expansions. We said that an interpretation of theoretical predicates is admissible if the expanded structure B resulting from model O by the addition of these theoretical relations satisfies the theory in question. Given this, the two types of choice-theoretical truth can be characterized in the following way: Let ϕ be an L (V o ) sentence. Then ϕ is weakly theoretically true if and only if there exists (at least) one choice function δ on
we say that ϕ is partially true if and only if one can construct an admissible expansion B from O based on a choice function δ such that B |= ϕ. Since model B is by definition a possible world in W, it follows that local truth is equivalent to weak theoretical truth (in the modal sense).
Similarly, we say that the epsilon-translate ϕ ε of a theoretical statements is generically true if and only if for every possible choice function δ on O such that I(P t ) = R t = val O,δ ( X T(X, O)) we have D, R o , R t |= ϕ(P t , O). Thus, the sentence ϕ is generically true if and only if ϕ is true in all possible expansions of O to full models of theory T that are constructed in the above sense. This is again equivalent to our definition of strong theoretical truth as truth in all possible worlds of M.
Inferential strength
In this section, we shall show that strong theoretical truth yields a more reasonable semantics of theoretical sentences than its weak alternative. This result carries over directly to the alternative between local and generic truth within the choice semantical treatment.
Our two modal notions of theoretical truth give rise to two different logics insofar as they define two different relations of logical consequence: Proposition 1 is clearly a desirable result in the analysis of informal deductive reasoning in science if one wants to retain (as Carnap did) constant theoretical terms as opposed to higher order variables. The Ramsey sentence itself, though semantically illuminating, provides a very cumbersome formulation of a theory that is unsuitable as analysis of scientific reasoning (cf. [16] ). It may be argued, moreover, that virtually all inference rules of classical natural deduction are needed to account for scientific reasoning. 21 Hence, it is a desirable result that the present logic of theoretical truth retains these inference rules.
Further extensions of this logic, such as logics of nonmonotonic and abductive reasoning, may be built on top of this classical core. 21 Disjunction introduction remains a controversial case, though.
The consequence relation of weak theoretical truth, however, is much less well behaved.
For example, it is easy to show that |= w fails to validate modus ponens. If modus ponens were valid for |= w , the following inference rule would have to be valid in S5:
A counterexample to this inference rule is easy to construct: let L(V) be a language of propositional modal logic with V = {p, q}. Let, further W (the set of worlds) be given by {w 1 , w 2 }. Suppose, in w 1 p and ¬q hold true, whereas in w 2 ¬p and ¬q are true. Then, it holds that ♦p, ♦(p → q) but not ♦q. Hence, there is a propositional modal S5 model for which modus ponens fails to be valid. This propositional model can easily be transformed into a first order modal model of the modal extension of L(V 0 , V t ). Simply assume that q is an L(V 0 , V t ) sentence that is false in all w ∈ W. p, by contrast, may be true in some w ∈ W and false in some other world w ∈ W.
In a similar vein, it can be shown that other important inference rules of natural deduction with two premises fail to hold for weak theoretical truth. This is particularly unfavorable for an account of scientific reasoning in the case of the following inference rule of first order logic with identity, which is sometimes referred to as the Leibniz principle:
This inference rule says that, if t = s and ϕ, t can be substituted for s in ϕ at all occurrences of s where s is free and t does not become bounded if substituted for s. The
Leibniz principle is used whenever we insert one equation into another; it is thus of utmost importance in physics and other sciences using mathematical equations. This principle is not valid in the logic of weak theoretical truth, however. It fails to be valid because s = t and ϕ may, respectively, be true at different worlds, while there is no world at which both s = t and ϕ are true.
In sum, the consequence relation of weak theoretical truth fails to validate inferential patterns that are at the core of scientific reasoning. We must therefore realize that weak theoretical truth does not explicate well the semantics of theoretical sentences. 
Inferential properties exemplified
Let us return to our collision experiment to exemplify the inferential weakness of local truth. Recall that the interpretation of mass is merely constrained by the laws of conservation of energy and conservation of momentum as well as the velocities of the objects before and after the collision. Given these constraints, it is easy to show that for any real number x there is a choice function such that m 1 = x. Likewise for m 2 . Hence, the following theoretical statements are locally true:
Now take the following inference:
The conclusion can be inferred using the Leibniz principle twice. This inference, however, is not valid according to the semantics of local truth. For there is no choice function such that m 1 < m 2 comes out locally true. Hence, the Leibniz principle is not valid for local truth.
A similar problem does not arise for generic truth because m 1 = 5 and m 2 = 7 are not generically true for obvious reasons. Moreover, the fact that m 1 = x is locally true for any arbitrary value x speaks against explicating theoretical truth in terms of local truth.
Such statements cannot be inferred from the measurements of our collision experiment.
Hence, they should not be true on our account of theoretical truth. By contrast, m 1 = m 2 is inferable from the measurements, which is generically true, as it should be.
Conclusion
We have described two different candidates for a choice-semantics of theoretical truth in It turns out that the logic of generic truth is inferentially equivalent to classical logic, which is a desirable result. Local truth, by contrast, is inferentially too weak to account for scientific reasoning. It could be shown, moreover, that the truth-value assignment of generic truth is more plausible than that of local truth for two reasons. First, the former, unlike the latter, avoids truth-value gluts. Second, the semantics of theoretical truth reflects the incompleteness of the interpretation of theoretical terms. Local truth, by contrast, may be described as overdeterminate because there are theoretical sentences being both locally true and locally false.
